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In 1977 the judiciary and legislature modified the immunity
that had previously protected charitable and sovereign hospitals
from tort liability, but they refused to extend the new rule to
other charitable organizations. In Brown v. Anderson County
Hospital Association' the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a charitable hospital may be liable for injuries inflicted
through acts of commission or omission of its agents, servants,
employees, or officers, if "the aggrieved party can establish that
the injuries occurred because of the hospital's heedlessness and
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights."' 2 Taking note of the
decision of the supreme court in Brown and the pleas of plaintiffs'
attorneys,3 the South Carolina General Assembly totally abro-
gated the doctrine by its ratification of Act No. 182 on June 7,
1977.1 The Act gives any person injured or killed by a tortious act
of a charitable or state hospital's employee, agent, servant, or
official the right to sue the organization for up to $100,000 actual
damages.'
1. 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
2. Id. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 876. The decision "applies only to this case and to those
causes of action arising after the filing of this opinion." Id. at 488, 234 S.E.2d at 877.
3. The supreme court has consistently held, up to the present time, that it was within
the prerogative of the legislature to modify or abrogate the doctrine of charitable immun-
ity and to waive sovereign immunity to allow suits against government supported hospi-
tals. Some members of the South Carolina Bar have repeatedly tried to force the court
into action and have also requested the legislature to act. See, e.g., Boyce v. Lancaster
County Natural Gas Auth., 266 S.C. 398, 223 S.E.2d 769 (1976); Belton v. Richland
Memorial Ho3p., 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975). See also note 18 infra.
4. No. 182, § 3, 1977 S.C. Acts 452 [codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-50 (Cum.
Supp. 1977)].
5. Id.
In addition to limiting recovery to $100,000, the section bars action against the em-
ployee who committed the tortious act if the claimant receives a judgment. Only the
employing entity may be named as a party defendant; plaintiff may not name the em-
ployee individually when bringing an action under the provisions of the Act. If the em-
ployee is named as a defendant, then the employer shall be substituted "when it can so
reasonably be determined." The section, however, in no way limits actions against doctors
or dentists. Id.
Section four of the Act provides for procurement of liability insurance by the state
for its employees and hospitals and for physicians and dentists rendering services for the
state when no fee is charged for those services. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-11-140 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
Section two provides for a three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions. The period is determined from the "date of the treatment, omission or operation
1
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Brown was initiated when decedent's administrators sued
Anderson Memorial Hospital to recover damages for injuries suf-
fered by the deceased and for his subsequent death. Brown was
committed to the hospital for unidentified causes and strapped
to a bed. A fire started in his room while he was confined; he
received severe bums and later died. Plaintiffs alleged that defen-
dant's agents were negligent and reckless in several respects: al-
lowing the fire to start, failing to extinguish it in a timely fashion,
and failing to protect the decedent from it.7 The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendant on the ground of chari-
table immunity.8 Plaintiffs appealed to the supreme court, and
petitioned for reconsideration of the court's position on the doc-
trine.
Appellant asked the court to follow other jurisdictions' deci-
sions overruling the doctrine of charitable immunity.? The princi-
pal rationale advanced by appellant and the amicus curiae briefs
submitted in support of abrogation'0 was that the original reason
for charities' immunity from tort liability no longer exists. Chari-
table immunity was created on public policy grounds to prevent
financial ruin of charitable organizations." The possibility of pay-
ing tort judgments could destroy charities through bankruptcy
giving rise to the cause of action or three years from date of discovery or when it reasonably
ought to have been discovered, not to exceed six years from date of occurrence." Id. § 15-
3-545. If the cause of action arises out of negligent leaving or placement of foreign objects
in the body, the action must commence within two years from date of discovery or when
discovery should reasonably occur. The section further provides that it is not retroactive.
Id.
6. See S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-5-90, 15-51-10, -20 (1976).
7. Record at 1.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Brief for Appellant at 1. For more discussion of the present status of the law in
other states on the doctrine of charitable immunity in general, see, Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d
29 (1952); 2 L. FRUMER, M. FRIEDMAN, L. PILGRIM, I. THAU, & R. DOBBIN, PERSONAL INJURY:
ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES 363-77 (1957 & Cum. Supp. 1977); IlA Hosp. L. MANUAL §
3, at 45-55 (1973). For historical discussions of the doctrine and excellent critical analyses,
see President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971); Freezer, The Tort Liability of Charities,
77 U. PA. L. REV. 191 (1928).
10. The South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association and Professor David G. Owen,
University of South Carolina School of Law, submitted amicus briefs in favor of modifica-
tion or abrogation. Submitting briefs advocating maintenance of the status quo were the
South Carolina College Council, South Carolina Hospital Association, the General Board
of South Carolina Baptist Convention and the Medical Society of South Carolina Operat-
ing Roper Hospital.
11. Brief for Appellant at 6; Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S.C.
197, 201, 88 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1916).
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and loss of donations. 2 This potential financial instability of a
charitable organization, however, is no longer a real danger. Hos-
pitals' budgets are frequently supported by patient revenue. 3 In
addition, most hospitals are covered by liability insurance.'4
The supreme court reversed for plaintiff. The majority was
persuaded by the logic of the dissent in Lindler v. Columbia
Hospital,5 the case that established the doctrine of charitable
immunity in South Carolina. The criticism expressed by that
dissent was that the charity's funds should "remedy the evil itself
has done, before it attempts to remedy the evils done by others."'
This view represents a major change in position for the supreme
court."
Before it could rationally modify or abrogate the doctrine,
however, the court had to overcome a major obstacle. In the past,
the court had insisted that any action to abolish the doctrine
should be legislative.'" The court pointed out, however, that the
12. President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 822 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
13. Id. at 824. See also amicus curiae brief of South Carolina Trial Lawyers Ass'n at
9-17.
The Brown court recognized this fact. 268 S.C. at 485 n.3, 234 S.E.2d at 875-76 n.3.
According to the figures presented therein, Anderson Memorial Hospital received $12
million annually from patient revenues and only $100,000 from Anderson County. The
court also mentioned the hospital administrator's deposition testimony that the
"hospital's funds come by and large from paying patients and at least 90% of all patients
pay their bills," although he "denied that the appropriation adequately defrayed the
expense of treating charity patients." Id.
14. Brief for Appellant at 6.
15. 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
16. Id. at 35, 81 S.E. at 515.
17. Until the Brown decision the court supported immunity for charitable and sover-
eign institutions and refused to limit its scope. Since the doctrine was created in 1914 and
gave hospitals immunity, the court extended coverage to colleges, Vermillion v. Women's
College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197,88 S.E. 649 (1916); Y.M.C.A.s, Caughman v. Columbia
Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788 (1948); and churches, Decker v. Bishop of Charles-
ton, 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
The court refused to extend immunity to an action for nuisance and trespass, Peden
v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C. 1, 151 S.E. 907 (1930); a cause of action arising out of a
commercial venture unrelated to the charitable purpose of the organization, Eiserhardt
v. State Ag. & Mech. Soc'y of S.C., 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568 (1959); a nonprofit, rural
electric cooperative, Bush v. Aiken Electric Coop., 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716 (1955); and
intentional torts, Jeffcoat v. Caine, 261 S.C. 25, 198 S.E.2d 258 (1973).
In Jeffcoat the court indicated that it realized the doctrine no longer had public
support. 261 S.C. at 80, 198 S.E.2d at 260.
18. In Belton v. Richland Memorial Hosp., 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975) (per
curiam decision), the court reaffirmed the stand it had taken on immunities.
Once firmly rooted, such [public] policy [created by the courts] becomes in
effect a rule of conduct or of property within the state. In the exercise of proper
3
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doctrine originally was established by the court. Because it was
not a creature of legislative enactment, it therefore was subject
to judicial modification.'9 The common-law practice of stare de-
cisis also was held not to bar modification of the rule; its purpose
is to ensure "certainty and stability," not "petrifying rigidity."' '
After shifting its position on abrogation of charitable immun-
ity, the court refused complete expungement of the doctrine.
Emphasizing the "vital role" charitable hospitals play in South
Carolina and a desire not to show "insensitivity... to legitimate
charitable concerns," the court lowered, but did not remove, the
shield of immunity.2' Only those suits based on allegations of
heedless and reckless negligence were to be allowed."
Justice Ness concurred in the result but dissented because he
believed that the doctrine should be abolished completely." He
agreed with the majority opinion that the doctrine is outmoded;
however, they differed on the utility of maintaining any immun-
ity for charitable hospitals. While the majority was concerned
with the hospitals' continuing vitality as charities serving the
public interest, the dissent characterized the charitable hospital
as a business institution that should be held responsible for its
torts as is any other business establishment.24 Justice Ness em-
phasized he would abolish hospitals' protection under the doc-
trine and leave true charities with the affirmative defense of im-
munity."
The supreme court's modification of the doctrine of charita-
ble immunity only applies to hospitals." The Brown holding ex-
judicial self-restraint, the courts should leave it to the people, through their
elected representatives in the General Assembly, to say whether or not it should
be revised or discarded.
263 S.C. at 450, 211 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567,
106 S.E.2d 258 (1958)). See also Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas Auth., 266 S.C.
398, 223 S.E.2d 769 (1976).
19. 268 S.C. at 485-86, 234 S.E.2d at 876.
20. Id. at 486-87, 234 S.E.2d at 876.
21. Id. at 487, 234 S.E.2d at 876.
22. Id.
The Act covers tortious acts, therefore, the legislature appears to have gone farther
than the court by proscribing negligent as well as reckless conduct. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 44-
7-50 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
23. 268 S.C. at 488, 2"34 S.E.2d at 877. Justice Gregory joined in the dissent.
24. Id. at 490-91, 234 S.E.2d at 878-79.
25. Id. at 490, 234 S.E.2d at 878-79.
26. Brown v. Anderson County Hosp. Ass'n, 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977).
In Crowley v. Bob Jones Univ., 268 S.C. 492, 234 S.E.2d 879 (1977), decided the same
day as Brown, the court refused to rule on reconsideration of the rule applied to eleemosy-
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pressly does not extend to "modify the defense of charitable im-
munity as to churches, rescue missions, orphanages, colleges, and
other institutions which are charitable in nature, purpose and
operation."' The legislative action in Act No. 182 also waives
immunity only for charitable and state-supported hospitals.
Consequently, previous decisions outlining the scope of chari-
table immunity are still relevant to all other charitable organiza-
tions.29
II. DEFAMATION
In Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co.30 plaintiff, a former state
senator, brought suit against defendant, publisher of The Field
and Herald and The Sun News,3 for malicious publication of a
defamatory article with intent to damage plaintiff's reputation
and ruin his career." From a jury verdict of $50,000.00 in favor of
plaintiff, defendant appealed on the ground that the trial judge
erred in not granting its motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto, and argued plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden
of proof.33 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision."
Because defendant's exceptions required a review of the
jury's findings of fact, the proper scope of review to be given the
record on appeal was at issue. This question, however, was left
nary corporations organized for educational purposes. The case was not developed suffi-
ciently to enable a decision on "so far-reaching an issue," and the case was remanded for
further proceedings. Id. at 491, 234 S.E.2d at 881. While the case is not overly significant
because of other problems of law involved, arguably it reemphasized applicability of the
doctrine to educational eleemosynary corporations.
27. 268 S.C. at 487-88, 234 S.E.2d at 877.
28. No. 182, § 3, 1977 S.C. Acts 452.
29. See note 17 supra.
30. 270 S.C. 65, 240 S.E.2d 812 (1978), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3753 (1978). A
previous opinion that decided procedural questions involved, Stevens v. Sun News Co.,
267 S.C. 63, 226 S.E.2d 236 (1976), is discussed in Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey
of South Carolina Law, 29 S.C.L. REv. 156.62 (1977).
31. Plaintiff, James Stevens, served as State Senator from Horry County from 1955
to 1976. Defendant's newspapers circulated in the Horry County area.
32. Record at 3-18.
The allegedly libelous report concerned the relationship between plaintiff and his
brother, Tommie Stevens, a purported con man and plaintiff's participation in the Sandy
Island Dvelopment Corporation, whose operations prompted federal intervention. Id. at
8, 51, 184-203. Another defamatory statement objected to was that plaintiff was being sued
for abuse of his political power. Plaintiff's former sister-in-law brought the suit, alleging
he had helped pressure two Horry County magistrates into issuing unlawful warrants for
her arrest. The suits were later dropped and were not pending at the time the article was
published. Record at 17.
33. 270 S.C. 65, 70, 240 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1978); Record at 244-45.
34. Id., 240 S.E.2d at 813.
5
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unresolved. The issue of scope of review arises from a conflict
between the South Carolina Constitution 35 and the position taken
by the United States Supreme Court on scope of review in defa-
mation cases. New York Times v. Sullivan36 was the United
States Supreme Court's initial application of the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution to state defamation ac-
tions. It called for "independent examination" of the entire re-
cord in defamation cases to ensure that the "judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."'
Subsequent cases in state and federal courts have raised New
York Times independent examination to the level of a constitu-
tional requirement.38 Article V, section 5 of the South Carolina
35. S.C. CONST., art. V, § 5.
36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 285, quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963). The
principles announced in New York Times were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Gertz
v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. See reply brief for Appellant (citing Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
Inc., 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1977); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976)). See
also Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977) ("To ensure that proper
weight has been given to the protection of first amendment rights, it is important that
the court make 'an independent examination of the whole record.'" Id. at 913); Carson
v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) ("Supreme Court has required that an
appellate court make an independent examination of the whole record," 529 F.2d at 210);
Sprouse v. Clay Communication Inc., - W. Va. -, 211 S.E.2d 675 (1975), cert.
denied 423 U.S. 882 (1975) ("the clearest leg4l principal [sic] emerging from a reading
of libel cases is that each case must be considered by an'appellate court on its facts with
a strong sympathy toward protection of the robust political discussion contemplated by
the First Amendment." 211 S.E.2d at 689). Contra, Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d
626 (10th Cir. 1977) ("The standard of review on libel actions is the same as in other cases
...We have repeatedly said that we will not retry the facts." 562 F.2d at 631).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 580B, Comment k (1977) states:
The determination of whether a defendant was negligent involves the applica-
tion of the standard (what a reasonable person would do) to the facts that are
found to exist in the particular case. This question is frequently called a fact
issue and it is normally submitted to the jury. But the rule that liability cannot
be imposed for a defamatory publication unless the defendant was negligent or
more seriously at fault is a rule imposed by the Constitution. The application
of the standard, therefore, necessarily involves a constitutional right, as in the
case of the determination of whether the defendant acted in reckless disregard
of the truth or falsity of a communication in a defamation action by a public
official or public figure. (See § 580A, Comment g). As in that case, the determi-
nation is subject to possible constitutional review all the way through the appel-
late process.
For further discussion of the applicable scope of review, see Anderson, Libel and Press
Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 467-69 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 249-50 (1976);
Recent Developments, 52 WASH. L. REv. 975, 984-85 (1977). For a discussion of the devel-
opment of the recently published Restatement provisions on defamation, see Wade,
Defamation, The First Amendment and the Torts Restatement, 11 FoRuhi 3 (1975).
6
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Constitution, however, limits the state supreme court's appellate
jurisdiction and review of factual findings. 9 The South Carolina
Supreme Court consistently has held that its power of review in
an action at law tried by a jury extends only to determining
whether the verdict is wholly unsupported by the evidence."' In
Stevens, the court decided, however, the verdict was correct
under either type of review and avoided a conflict between the
South Carolina Constitution and the first amendment."
The common law imposed a strict liability standard for libel-
ous and slanderous communications, tempered by absolute and
conditional privileges protecting the public interest. 2 This stan-
dard resulted in large judgments rendered against newspapers.
3
The United States Supreme Court began reformation by imbuing
the law of defamation with constitutional principles. Although
some commentators disagree with the Court's method of accom-
plishing reform," a national law of defamation undoubtedly has
developed in Supreme Court decisions applying the first amend-
ment to public communications. 5
New York Times held that damages could not be recovered
39. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 5 states:
And the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only in cases of equity, and in
such appeals they shall review the findings of fact as well as the law, except in
cases where the facts are settled by the jury and the verdict not set aside, and
shall constitute a Court for the correction of errors at law under such regulations
as the General Assembly may prescribe.
See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-320 to -330 (1976).
40. Townes Assoc. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976);
Odom v. Weathersbee, 225 S.C. 253, 260, 81 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1954); Worrell v. South
Carolina Power Co., 186 S.C. 306, 314, 195 S.E. 638, 641 (1938).
41. 270 S.C. at 70, 240 S.E.2d at 815.
42. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 113, at 772-74 (4th ed. 1971); REarATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRrs, Special Note on Conditional Privileges and the Constitutional Re-
quirement of Fault at 259-61 (1977); Wade, supra note 38 at 4.
43. For example, in New York Times, a jury verdict of $500,000 was awarded against
defendant at trial.
44. See, e.g., Green, The Communicative Torts, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1, 5 (1975): "The
success of these efforts [introducing negligence law into libel actions] would be extremely
harmful to the administration of tort law, particularly to the litigants' assertions of their
rights and defenses."
45. The Supreme Court has given some indication to this effect:
Our touchstones are that acceptable limitations must neither affect 'the impar-
tial distribution of news' and ideas, nor because of their history or impact
constitute a special burden on the press, nor deprive our free society of the
stimulating benefit of varied ideas because their purveyors fear physical or
economic retribution solely because of what they choose to think and publish.
The history of libel law leaves little doubt that it originated in soil entirely
different from that which nurtured these constitutional values.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150-51 (1967) (emphasis added).
7
Gould: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
1979] TORTS
in an action for defamation of a public official46 without clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice on the defamer's part."
Under the first amendment, a showing of knowledge or reckless
disregard of the falsity or truth of the material is required to
establish actual malice." The public's interest in the activities of
public officials and the public officials' "access to the means of
counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the
falsehood and falacies' of the defamatory statement" are the
Court's justifications for these stricter standards of fault and
proof.49 The standard of fault imposed by New York Times neces-
sarily implies that the defamation plaintiff, as in Stevens, must
prove defendant's malice as an element of the cause of action.'"
In Stevens, the court found, when reviewing the record in the
manner mandated by state law,5' that ample testimony was avail-
able to satisfy the actual malice requirement of New York Times
v. Sullivan."2 De novo review of the record, assuming it was re-
46. Although the issue of who is a public official or public figure has been widely
litigated; see, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Ray, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Meeropol v. Nizer,
560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1977); Buckley
v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir.
1976); in Stevens characterization of plaintiff as a public official was accepted by both
parties and the court.
47. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
48. Id. The phrase "knowledge or reckless disregard" is used for the most part rather
than "actual malice" in the cases since New York Times. The phrase has been defined to
require a "high degree of awareness of... probable falsity." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968). "[Mlere proof of failure to investigate, without more, cannot estab-
lish reckless disregard for the truth." Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974).
49. 388 U.S. at 155. This theme of a self-help remedy is repeated in later cases, see
Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and appears to be a major justification for
placing the actual malice standard on public officials. Those who have thrust themselves
into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy," 388 U.S. at 155, have given up any
"legitimate call [they had] upon the court for protection in light of ... prior activities
and means of self-defense." 388 U.S. at 154. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), further explains the distinction in treatment between public figures and officials
and private individuals:
[c]ommunications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk
of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is
justified with respect to a private individual .... He has relinquished no part
of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has
a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory
falsehood.
Id. at 345.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Commentj (1977).
51. See notes 38 and 39 and accompanying text supra.
52. 270 S.C. at 70, 240 S.E.2d at 815.
8
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quired, revealed that appellant published the articles with
"reckless disregard of the falsity of their contents."" Evidence
particularly indicative of malice or reckless disregard was testi-
mony that the reporter who had written the offending article used
a biased source. 4 One witness testified that the reporter spoke of
The Sun News' dislike for plaintiff before publication and knew
before printing the article that some of the information was
false." This led the court to conclude actual malice was present
under either standard of review.-6
New York Times has had a cumulative effect on the proce-
dural elements of the law of defamation. Historically the burden
of proving the truth of the defamatory statement to escape liabil-
ity had been on the defendant. 57 Because proof of malice now
brings into issue the defendant's knowledge of the falsity or reck-
less disregard of the truth, the burden of proving truth need never
shift to the defendant. When the plaintiff meets the burden of
proving actual malice at trial, however, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court is unlikely to impose procedural disadvantages upon
appeal.
III. PREMISES LIABILITY
In Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc.,'8 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a storeowner's duty to take
reasonable care59 to protect invitees does not as a matter of course
include the duty of protecting customers against criminal attacks
of third parties." This duty will arise, however, if the plaintiff can





57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Commentj (1977).
58. 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
59. The duty of reasonable care is recognized by Dean Prosser and South Carolina
case law to be the duty owed by owners and occupiers of land to their invitees. Turner v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 254 S.C. 36, 173 S.E.2d 356 (1970); Mullinax v. Great Atlantic &
Pac. Tea Co., 221 S.C. 433, 70 S.E.2d 911 (1952); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 61, at 392
(4th ed. 1971).
60. 269 S.C. at 485, 238 S.E.2d at 169. This appears to be the majority rule. See, e.g.,
O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 2d 105, 255 N.E.2d 205 (1970); Levin v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 535 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. of App. 1976); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528
S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975); Eastep v. Jack-in-the-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 619 (1966 & Supp. 1977). For a discussion of Eastep
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criminal acts were impending.' If the obligation to protect
against criminal attacks of third parties is established, then a
storeowner who negligently fails to provide protection may be
liable for injuries sustained on the property, despite the interven-
ing criminal act of another.
62
The incident that sparked this litigation occurred in defen-
dant's parking lot. Plaintiff was beaten and robbed at dusk by
two assailants while attempting to enter his vehicle after purchas-
ing groceries. The lights in the lot were either not on or were not
burning brightly. 3 Plaintiff brought the action alleging defen-
dant's negligent failure to protect invitees.64 From a decision
granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the supreme
court affirmed.
Plaintiff framed the issue on appeal as whether the testi-
mony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, raised a
reasonable inference that defendant failed to light and supervise
the parking lot adequately.66 He argued defendant had a duty to
light the lot adequately because business proprietors owe to their
invitees a full duty of reasonable care. 7 Plaintiff argued this duty
61. 269 S.C. at 485, 238 S.E.2d at 169. The court fails to specify the degree to which
attacks must be likely to occur. In Shipes the court said "respondent did not know or have
reason to know of criminal attacks such as the one on appellant." Id. The implication is
that at least one attack must have already occurred and that the presence of hoodlums is
insufficient to give rise to fear of imminent assault. The court noted a decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court that held merchants must guard against criminal attacks of
third parties if they knew these attacks were occurring or "about to occur," leaving some
hope that the South Carolina Supreme Court may adopt such a standard in the future.
Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 198 (Tenn. 1975).
62. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S.C. 267, 37 S.E.2d 737 (1946); Green v.
Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 131 S.C. 124, 126 S.E. 441 (1925). Logically the proxi.
mate cause issue will not prove burdensome once the duty to protect against attacks of
third parties has been established. To establish the duty, knowledge of imminent criminal
acts must be proven, which would also seem to establish foreseeability of possible criminal
attacks, and, therefore, continuing responsibility of the original tortfeasor. See Brief for
Appellant at 15-16. Contra Brief for Respondent at 8-11. The rule stated by Ayers is as
follows:
The intervening negligence of another will not excuse the first tort-feasor,
if the intermediate wrong or a similar one should have been foreseen in the
exercise of due care; the original negligence remains active and constitutes a
concurring proximate cause of the ultimate injury. We repeat that it matters
not that the supervening and concurrent cause was an act of negligence of a third
person or even a willful or criminal act. (citations omitted.)
208 S.C. at 276, 37 S.E.2d at 741.
63. 269 S.C. at 482, 238 S.E.2d at 168. See also Record at 20, 30, 32, 34, 46.
64. Record at 4-5.
65. 269 S.C. at 481, 238 S.E.2d at 167.
66. Brief for Appellant at 4.
67. Id. at 5. This definition of the duty of reasonable care was drawn from Prosser's
10
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included "taking reasonable precautions to protect the invitee
from dangers which are foreseeable from the arrangement or use
of the premises.""5 The foreseeable risk of criminal conduct out-
weighed the slight burden of providing adequate lighting, and
created the duty. 9 Plaintiff argued that the need to light the
parking lot and whether adequate lighting had been provided
were jury issues.70
Defendant first argued that it had no duty to protect invitees
from criminal acts of third parties and, therefore, had no duty to
provide lights in the parking lot.7 Although agreeing with plain-
tiff that the occupier of land has a "duty of exercising ordinary
and reasonable care to maintain his premises"7 2 for invitees, de-
fendant maintained that storekeepers are not insurers of their
customers' safety.7 It argued that the duty of ordinary care does
not extend to criminal acts of third parties, unless a storeowner
has sufficient notice of the possibility of this danger.74 Finally,
defendant submitted that plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove defendant had "knowledge or notice of any
relevant criminal activity,71 5 and, therefore, the trial court had
properly granted defendant's motion for directed verdict.
7
1
Evidence was introduced at trial going to the issue of notice
of the risk incurred by the store's invitees. On this issue, the court
acknowledged evidence that the only crimes of which the man-
ager was aware were theft from an employee's car in the parking
lot and shoplifting in the store.77 Apparently this was the basis for
the conclusion that defendant did not know or have reason to
know of the potential crime to establish a duty of reasonable care
against the criminal acts of third parties.7 The court failed to
mention testimony plaintiff had introduced that crimes were fre-
quently committed in the parking lot because of the locale, poor
treatise and reads as follows: "the obligation of reasonable care is a full one, applicable
in all respects, and extending to everything that threatens the invitee with an unreasona-
ble risk of harm." W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 61 at 393.
68. Brief for Appellant at 5.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Brief for Respondent at 4.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 8.
77. 269 S.C. at 482, 238 S.E.2d at 168. See also Record at 71, 65.
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lighting conditions, and fortuitous means of exit.7 1 Why this evi-
dence was not considered is unclear. The court stated that under
the facts of the case defendant "did not know or have reason to
know of criminal attacks such as the one on [plaintiff]."'' The
court appeared to distinguish, however, between incidents within
and outside of the storeowner's personal knowledge which leads
one to the conclusion that actual knowledge may be required
before a duty to protect customers from criminal attacks can be
established. Unless actual knowledge can be shown, then the
premises liability plaintiff presumably will have a difficult time
getting past defendant's motion for a directed verdict on this
preliminary issue.
After ruling on the duty of care owed by owners and occu-
piers of land to their invitees against criminal acts of third par-
ties, the court went on to mention that, assuming a duty to ade-
quately light the parking lot was present, plaintiff had failed to
prove a breach of that duty.8' Addressing the secondary issue
plaintiff had presented on appeal, the court held that proof of how
long the lights had been extinguished was necessary to raise a jury
issue on defendant's negligence. 2 The amount of proof set out by
the Shipes opinion to get the negligence issue to the jury is the
same as that required for constructive notice in slip and fall
premises liability cases."3 Proof of how long the lights had been
out should be presented by the plaintiff at trial."4
Shipes serves to illustrate plaintiffs' difficulty in successfully
79. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, see also Record at 36-38, 45-48, 52-53.
80. 269 S.C. at 485, 238 S.E.2d at 169.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Joye v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1968); Mullen v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, 252 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1958); H.L. Green Co. v. Bowen, 223 F.2d 523
(4th Cir. 1955); Anderson v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 257 S.C. 75, 184 S.E.2d 77
(1971); Wimberley v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969).
See also McKay, Merchants Liability in South Carolina for Injuries on the Premises -
An Anachronism, 23 S.C.L. REV. 709 (1971).
84. Anderson v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 257 S.C. 75, 184 S.E.2d 77 (1971), set
the standard for constructive notice as the appearance that "the condition has existed for
such length of time prior to the injury that, under existing circumstances, he should have
discovered and remedied it in the exercise of due care; conversely, absent evidence of such
preexistence, the defendant may not be charged." 257 S.C. 75, 77, 184 S.E.2d 77, 77 (1971).
For a discussion of Anderson, see Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 24 S.C.L.
REv. 665, 673-74 (1971). For a condemnation of the heavy burden of proof this standard
places on the plaintiff, see Wimberley v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165
S.E.2d 627 (1969) (Justice Bussey, dissenting); Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 21 S.C.L. REV. 659, 666-68 (1969).
19791 TORTS
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litigating premises liability actions. The difficulty of establishing
duty and breach of duty is likely to dissuade plaintiffs' counsel
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